A walk through the whole topic. The challenges of the global commons, fifty years of summits and treaties, what international cooperation has and has not delivered, the deep-versus-shallow ecology divide, and the question behind every exam essay: is the international community capable of solving a crisis that ignores borders?
The global environment is the classic test case of international cooperation. The atmosphere, the oceans, the climate system and biodiversity belong to no state, but every state has the power to damage them and every state must agree to protect them. The 2023 examiner report described the topic as a question of "the strengths and weaknesses of the global community in dealing with the issue of the environment", and contrasted "almost universal commitment" with "the perceived inadequate actions of states". This walk-through takes the whole of Topic 7 in order: the challenges, the fifty-year history of attempts to address them, the case for and against international cooperation, the theoretical lenses you are expected to apply, and the questions the topic produces in the exam.
What makes the environment uniquely hard to govern, and the concepts you need before anything else.
The environment is governed badly for one structural reason: it is a global commons. The atmosphere, the oceans beyond territorial waters, Antarctica and outer space all belong to no state. Every state can take from them and damage them; no state can be excluded. Garrett Hardin, writing in 1968, called this the tragedy of the commons: rational actors over-using a shared resource because the benefit of consumption falls to one but the cost is shared by all. Carbon emissions are the canonical case.
The structural problem produces two political problems. The first is free-riding: any state that pollutes while others restrain enjoys the cleaner air without paying the cost of restraint. The second is the North-South divide: developed states caused the bulk of historical emissions, while many of the worst impacts now fall on developing states. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit captured the response in a phrase the topic returns to repeatedly - "common but differentiated responsibilities" (CBDR) - which acknowledges that all states share the problem but not equally.
Climate change, biodiversity, deforestation, oceans. Scroll, and each lights up in turn.
The environmental crisis is not one issue. The exam expects you to be able to name and discuss several, and to recognise that they intersect. The diagram beside you holds the four main strands.
Four challenges sit under the umbrella of the global environment topic: climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation and the state of the oceans. They are linked - deforestation drives both climate change and biodiversity loss - but each has its own governance, its own treaties and its own politics. Scroll, and each lights in turn.
The headline issue. Global average surface temperatures are now around 1.3C above pre-industrial levels, and the 2024 calendar year was the first to exceed the 1.5C threshold of the Paris Agreement on annual average. Emissions continue to rise: CO2 concentrations passed 420ppm in 2023, the highest in roughly three million years. The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (2021-23) confirmed that human influence on warming is now "unequivocal". Climate change is the test that every other environmental concern is now read through.
The World Wildlife Fund's Living Planet Report 2024 recorded a 73% average decline in monitored wildlife populations since 1970. Habitat loss, climate change and over-exploitation are the main drivers. The 2022 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework agreed the 30 by 30 target - to protect 30% of land and sea by 2030 - the first major species treaty since the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. Implementation, as ever, is the question.
An area of forest the size of Iceland is lost every year. The Amazon is the headline case - the Bolsonaro presidency (2019-22) saw deforestation rates jump; the Lula return in 2023 saw them fall sharply, illustrating how much depends on a single national government. Indonesia, the DRC and Brazil together hold the largest tropical rainforests. The 2021 Glasgow Declaration on Forests committed 145 states (covering 91% of the world's forests) to halting deforestation by 2030. Mid-decade reviews show the target slipping.
The oceans absorb roughly a quarter of human CO2 emissions, leading to acidification that threatens coral and shell-forming species. An estimated 8 million tonnes of plastic enter the oceans each year. The 2023 UN High Seas Treaty (BBNJ Agreement) is the first to allow marine protected areas in the high seas - the two-thirds of the ocean that lies beyond any state's jurisdiction. A binding global plastics treaty is under negotiation but agreement has been delayed by oil-producing states.
The four challenges share the structure that defines the topic - they are commons problems with cross-border drivers and unevenly distributed harms. A strong essay names the issue it is discussing, but recognises the deeper point: every one of these strands fails the same political test. They need agreement among sovereign states whose short-term interests pull against the collective.
Stockholm 1972 to Dubai 2023. Scroll the timeline beside you.
International environmental governance is structured around named summits and treaties. The 2023 examiner report named the milestones expected in any strong answer: "Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen and more recent summits including Paris". The timeline beside you maps them in order.
Environmental governance moves through three eras. The setup, 1972-92: the first conferences, the founding institutions, the science. The high era of treaties, 1992-2009: Rio, Kyoto, the building of binding obligations. The post-Copenhagen reset, 2009 onwards: pledges in place of targets, the Paris model, slow but near-universal participation. Scroll the milestones.
The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was the first major UN meeting dedicated to the environment. It produced the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm Declaration. The environment became part of the UN system. The conference was also the moment when the North-South tension first appeared in environmental form: Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said poverty was "the worst form of pollution", framing the developing-world critique that has run through every summit since.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is the environmental governance success the topic returns to repeatedly. CFCs were banned, the ozone hole over Antarctica is now slowly closing, and the protocol is universally ratified. The conditions were unusually favourable - few substances, few producers, available alternatives - but Montreal proved that binding multilateral environmental governance can work. It is the case for cooperation in pure form.
The largest gathering of heads of state up to that point. The Rio Earth Summit produced the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which still anchors all climate negotiation, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Agenda 21 (a sustainable development action plan). It also produced the formal principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, accepting that developed states bore the historical responsibility for emissions.
The first binding emissions treaty under the UNFCCC. Developed states (Annex I) accepted binding reduction targets averaging 5% below 1990 levels by 2008-12. The mechanism included cap and trade, named in the 2023 examiner report as the standard example. The US signed but never ratified; developing states had no binding obligations. Kyoto was real but limited - the binding architecture worked in principle but excluded the largest future emitters.
Expectations were enormous; the outcome was a non-binding accord cobbled together at the last minute by Obama, Wen Jiabao, Manmohan Singh, Lula and Zuma. The two-degree target survived but there were no binding national emission targets. Copenhagen ended the top-down model of binding global targets. What replaced it - the Paris model - was a recognition that the binding approach had hit a political wall.
Near-universal: 195 states signed. The Paris approach is bottom-up: each state submits a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and updates it every five years. Targets are not legally binding, but reporting is. The aim: hold warming "well below 2C" and pursue 1.5C. Paris is the architectural breakthrough of the modern era - it bought universal participation at the cost of binding targets.
President Trump announced US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017; Biden rejoined on day one in 2021. Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 and signed a second withdrawal order on his first day. The pattern is the structural weakness of voluntary international climate governance - a single domestic election in the world's second-largest emitter can pull the second-largest economy out of the regime overnight.
Three recent COPs measure where the regime stands. Glasgow COP26 (2021) watered "phase out" coal to "phase down" under Indian and Chinese pressure. Sharm El-Sheikh COP27 (2022) agreed in principle to a loss and damage fund to compensate vulnerable states. Dubai COP28 (2023) operationalised loss and damage, made the first explicit reference to "transitioning away from fossil fuels", and concluded the first Global Stocktake - which confirmed the world is well off track for 1.5C.
The 2023 examiner report summary holds: "almost universal commitment to tackling environmental degradation" set against "the perceived inadequate actions of states". The pattern is consistent for fifty years. The architecture grows; the emissions do not fall fast enough. The next parts ask why.
The genuine successes, the universal regime, the NGO contribution. The strongest defence.
The strongest defence of international environmental governance rests on four facts. One treaty (Montreal) genuinely worked. The Paris regime is near-universal. The IPCC has built an unparalleled scientific consensus. NGOs and non-state actors have grown in power and reach. The diagram beside you holds them.
The case for cooperation rests on four strands: a clean treaty success, a near-universal regime, a scientific consensus that few topics command, and a thick layer of non-state action. Scroll through them.
The Montreal Protocol shows what is possible. CFC production fell by more than 98% from 1986 to 2010, the ozone hole over Antarctica has begun to recover, and the treaty has been ratified by every UN member state. Kofi Annan called it "perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date". Defenders of the multilateral approach point to Montreal whenever asked whether the system can deliver.
Paris broke the impasse that ended Copenhagen. Where Kyoto reached 37 developed countries with binding targets but excluded the largest emerging emitters, Paris draws in 195 states. Pre-Paris projections of 4-5C of warming have been replaced by current trajectories of around 2.7C if pledges are met. That is not 1.5C, but it is two degrees less than no agreement at all. The architecture works even where the ambition falls short.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, founded in 1988 by UNEP and the WMO, is one of the most successful instances of inter-governmental scientific coordination ever attempted. Its assessment reports are written by thousands of scientists and approved line by line by every member government. The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6, 2021-23) is the most-cited scientific document of the decade. Without the IPCC there would be no agreed factual basis for negotiation.
Environmental governance has always relied on non-state actors. Greenpeace (founded 1971) and the World Wildlife Fund (1961) monitor, lobby and shame. Greta Thunberg's school strike from 2018 onwards created a youth movement now woven into COP politics. Subnational actors matter too: when Trump withdrew the US in 2017, the "We Are Still In" coalition of US states, cities and businesses kept American emissions falling. California's emissions trading scheme is one of the world's largest.
The current regime is real, near-universal, scientifically grounded and reinforced by non-state action. Without it, the world would be on a path to four or five degrees of warming. Imperfect cooperation is not nothing.
Where the regime fails. Emissions still rising, vetoes still landing, North-South divide unresolved.
The 2023 examiner report set "almost universal commitment" against "the perceived inadequate actions of states". The case against international environmental cooperation is not that nothing has been done; it is that what has been done is, on the measure that matters, insufficient. Five strands stand behind that claim.
The case against has five strands. Emissions still rising, fossil-fuel producers blocking, the North-South divide unresolved, US politics destabilising the regime, and free-riding still profitable. Scroll through them.
Despite three decades of treaties, global CO2 emissions reached a record high in 2023. The 1.5C target of Paris is now widely judged out of reach; even the IPCC scenarios consistent with 1.5C require negative emissions through unproven removal technology. The UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024 showed the gap between current policy and the Paris pathway widening, not narrowing. The regime is working as a process; it is failing as an outcome.
COP outcomes are watered down by oil and gas producers. Glasgow COP26 changed "phase out" coal to "phase down" after Indian and Chinese pressure. Saudi Arabia, Russia and the OPEC bloc have repeatedly blocked stronger fossil-fuel language. COP28 in Dubai was hosted by the UAE oil minister Sultan al-Jaber, the head of ADNOC, the national oil company - and recordings emerged of him questioning the science of fossil fuel phase-out before the talks. The text still passed, but only after vocabulary battles that exposed the producer veto.
The historical injustice runs through every summit. Developed economies caused most of the cumulative emissions; many of the worst impacts now fall on small island states, low-lying coastal nations and the Sahel. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities formalised the difference in 1992, but the politics of who pays has stalled the regime repeatedly. The 2009 Copenhagen pledge of $100 billion a year in climate finance from developed to developing countries was missed for over a decade and only met in 2022.
The world's second-largest emitter has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement twice in eight years. The Bush administration never ratified Kyoto. The Trump administration withdrew in 2017; Biden rejoined in 2021; Trump withdrew again in 2025. A regime built on voluntary national pledges cannot survive that volatility - no other state will impose costs on its industry that the US is unwilling to bear.
Hardin's structural problem has not been solved. Any state that pollutes while others restrain enjoys the cleaner air without paying the cost - and the Paris architecture, by making targets non-binding, has effectively legalised the free-ride. China is now the world's largest emitter; its NDC commits only to peaking emissions "before 2030", not to absolute reductions. India is similar. Without enforcement, voluntary pledges produce voluntary results.
The architecture exists; the outcomes do not. Universal commitment, inadequate action - the examiner-report summary holds. A strong essay names the regime's achievements and then weighs them honestly against emissions data, the 1.5C trajectory, and the producer veto.
The named ideological divide every essay is expected to recognise.
The exam expects you to recognise the ideological split that runs through environmental thought. Shallow ecology (sometimes called "ecological modernisation") works within the existing economic system and seeks reform - green growth, carbon pricing, technology. Deep ecology, named in 1973 by Arne Naess, rejects the anthropocentric premise altogether - it places the natural world on the same moral level as human beings and calls for a fundamental restructuring of how societies relate to nature. The diagram beside you holds the two side by side.
Shallow ecology and deep ecology disagree about how serious a change is needed. Shallow ecology says the system can deliver if it is reformed; deep ecology says the system itself is the problem. The diagram beside you holds them; each takes a turn.
Shallow ecology, sometimes called ecological modernisation, takes humans as the moral centre and the existing economic system as the framework. It supports market-based instruments: carbon pricing, emissions trading, green technology investment, subsidies for renewables. It is the position of most actually existing governments, of the IPCC's policy chapters, and of the Paris Agreement itself. The state remains the actor; the market remains the tool.
Deep ecology, Arne Naess in 1973, rejects anthropocentrism. The natural world has intrinsic value, not just value to humans. Population restraint, "ecological self-realisation" and radical reduction of consumption follow. Activist groups like Earth First!, Extinction Rebellion in its strongest readings, and the degrowth movement carry deep-ecology positions. Deep ecology argues that the current system - growth, consumption, capitalism - cannot solve the crisis it produces.
Both positions sit within a wider debate Paper 3 students are expected to recognise. Realists argue states are inherently self-interested and that environmental cooperation is therefore weak by design; the Paris regime is the best states can do because the alternative is no regime at all. Liberals argue that institutions, NGOs and complex interdependence can solve commons problems if given time, and that the architecture itself is the achievement. Anti-globalisation critics, including world-systems theorists, see capitalism as the underlying driver and call for systemic change.
The evidence largely fits the realist-shallow position by default - the regime that exists is reformist, market-based and dependent on state self-interest. Whether that regime is sufficient to the crisis is the question deep ecologists press. The strongest essays note that shallow ecology has the political feasibility and deep ecology has the diagnostic accuracy: the regime is working as a process but failing as an outcome.
The questions this topic produces and the lines they reward.
Paper 3 Global examines the environment as part of the 12-mark Section A comparison and as a 30-mark essay (Q3). The questions below reflect real and likely Paper 3 forms.
Trap: the 2023 examiner report flagged "direct and consistent comparison" as the differentiator. Strong responses moved between environment and rights, not through them in sequence. Use Part 3 (Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen, Paris) for the environment side; pair with UDHR, ICC, ECHR, R2P. Pick a verdict - usually rights has the clearer institutional success (ICC convictions) and the environment has the wider participation but worse outcomes.
Trap: "failed" is too strong. Argue partial failure on the outcome (emissions, 1.5C) and partial success on the architecture (Paris universality, IPCC consensus, Montreal). Use Parts 4 and 5 directly. The honest line is "the regime exists and is necessary, but it is insufficient on the measure that matters most".
Trap: "main" forces a comparison. Set sovereignty against other obstacles - producer veto, free-riding, the North-South divide, US political volatility. Argue sovereignty IS the main obstacle (because every other obstacle is a symptom of it) or reach for a more nuanced answer that names the structural commons problem.
Trap: "fundamental advance" - against what baseline? Use the Kyoto-Paris comparison: Paris bought universality at the cost of binding targets. Argue the move was necessary post-Copenhagen but the architecture cannot deliver 1.5C without a step change in ambition. Cite the Global Stocktake at COP28.
Approach: three named institutions, three named contributions. UNFCCC and the COP process for treaty-making; IPCC for science; UNEP for coordination and reporting. One named example per route.
Approach: both accept the environmental crisis is real and human-caused; both call for political action; both criticise unregulated markets. The differences (anthropocentric vs ecocentric; reformist vs radical) are where most marks live, but the question demands similarities, so lead with them.
Three directly comparative themes - each pits the regime that exists against a sharp counter, so AO3 evaluation of "failed" runs through each paragraph rather than only in the conclusion.
Other comparative themes you could substitute: realist against liberal explanations (states-as-selfish against institutions-can-solve); shallow ecology against deep ecology (reformist market-based action against systemic critique); state against non-state action (Trump's withdrawals against California ETS and "We Are Still In"); IPCC science against political negotiation (consensus knowledge against fossil-producer veto language at COP26 and COP28).
You have walked the topic. Now check your recall and structure your answers.
The vocabulary the examiner expects you to define and use.
Global commons - resources that belong to no state: atmosphere, high seas, Antarctica, outer space.
Tragedy of the commons - Garrett Hardin's 1968 analysis: rational actors over-use a shared resource because the benefit is private and the cost is shared.
Free-rider problem - a state that pollutes while others restrain enjoys the cleaner environment without paying for restraint.
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed at Rio 1992; the anchor of all climate negotiation.
Kyoto Protocol (1997) - first binding emissions treaty under the UNFCCC; developed states only; cap-and-trade.
Paris Agreement (2015) - near-universal climate agreement; Nationally Determined Contributions; aim of "well below 2C", aspiration of 1.5C.
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) - the voluntary, country-specific emissions plan submitted to the UNFCCC every five years under Paris.
Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) - the principle, formalised at Rio 1992, that all states share responsibility for the environment but not equally, given historical emissions and current capabilities.
Loss and damage fund - agreed in principle at COP27 (2022) and operationalised at COP28 (2023) to compensate vulnerable states for climate impacts they did not cause.
IPCC - the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, founded 1988 by UNEP and the WMO; produces the assessment reports.
UNEP - the United Nations Environment Programme, created at Stockholm 1972.
Montreal Protocol (1987) - international treaty that phased out CFCs; widely regarded as the most successful environmental agreement.
Shallow ecology - anthropocentric, reformist environmentalism; supports market-based instruments and ecological modernisation.
Deep ecology - ecocentric environmentalism; Arne Naess 1973; intrinsic value of nature; calls for systemic change.
Climate justice - the position that the burden of action and the costs of impact should fall on the states that caused the historic emissions, not on those facing the worst consequences.
Global Stocktake - a five-yearly review under Paris of collective progress toward the goal; the first concluded at COP28 in Dubai 2023.