About these notes. This is the sub-topic lookup version. For the narrative scrollytelling lesson with the factor, election and media figures, use the Walk-through. For active recall, use the MCQ Quiz. The full election case studies live in the Four Elections pack, and polling in depth lives in the Opinion Polls pack. The cards below cover the long-term and short-term factors, dealignment, turnout, the case-study elections, the media debate and the exam method.
Likely exam angles. The 30-marker lands on one of three debates: age versus class as the most important influence (the signature post-2017 question); short-term versus long-term factors; or the media against the other factors (the 2022 mocks Q2a and 2020 Q1a questions). Each one is covered in the cards below.
Two kinds of explanation for every result. Long-term factors (CAGER) - Class, Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Region - are the slow-moving social facts about a voter. Short-term factors (CLIMP) - Campaign, Leadership, Issues, Manifesto, Press and polls - drive the final weeks.
| Factor | The old pattern | The new pattern |
|---|---|---|
| Class | AB/C1 Conservative, C2/DE Labour - the master predictor of 1945-92. First crack: the 1979 C2 swing (41% of skilled workers Conservative, up 11 points, helped by Right to Buy). | Fragmented. 2019: working-class Leave seats went Conservative, middle-class Remain cities Labour. 2024: working-class voters split Labour/Reform, middle-class Labour/Lib Dem. |
| Age | A small Conservative lean among older voters - barely a factor in 1979. | The dominant divide. 2019: under-25s around 57% Labour, over-65s around 62% Conservative - the largest gap in modern polling. 2024: tipping point around 50. |
| Gender | Women marginally more Conservative for decades - even under a female Conservative leader in 1979. | Reversed in 1997, when women moved decisively to Labour. Since 2017 a slight Labour lean; Reform under-performed with women in 2024. Always a modest gap. |
| Ethnicity | Non-white voters roughly 80% Labour in 1979. | Still heavily Labour - around 64% to 20% Conservative in 2019 - but with internal variation: Hindu voters less Labour-leaning since 2019, further Conservative slippage among South Asian voters in 2024. |
| Region | North-South divide formed in 1979, structural by 1983 - Labour confined to industrial heartlands. | Scrambled. 2019: Red Wall fell, Scotland went SNP (48 of 59). 2024: Scotland turned Labour (37 of 57), the Red Wall mostly returned, the Conservatives squeezed into a southern blue wall, Reform won Clacton and a handful of northern and coastal seats. |
Spec point P1.4.1.a: three case studies - one from 1945-92, the 1997 election, and one since 1997.
| Election | Result | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
| 1979 | Con 339 / 43.9%; Lab 269 / 36.9%; majority 43; turnout 76% | Class still ruled but the C2 swing began the working-class drift. Winter of Discontent; 'Labour Isn't Working'; The Sun backed the Conservatives decisively for the first time. |
| 1983 | Con 397 / 42.4%; Lab 209 / 27.6%; Alliance 23 / 25.4%; majority 144; turnout 72.7% | Manifesto misfire ('the longest suicide note in history'); Falklands leadership effect; the Alliance's 25.4% returning 23 seats - FPTP punishing spread support. |
| 1997 | The Blair landslide - the compulsory case study | The New Labour realignment. Women moved decisively to Labour for the first time; gaining The Sun was pivotal (2022 mocks MS); the months of landslide polling confirmed by the result is the bandwagon evidence; turnout (71%) starts the long decline. |
| 2019 | Con 365 / 43.6%; Lab 202 / 32.1%; SNP 48 / 3.9%; majority 80; turnout 67.3% | Brexit as the single dominant issue; record age gap; extraordinary class realignment (Leave seats Conservative, Remain cities Labour); the Red Wall fell; Corbyn's record-low ratings. |
| 2024 | Lab 411 / 33.7%; Con 121 / 23.7%; LD 72 / 12.2%; Reform 5 / 14.3%; majority 174; turnout 60.0% | The valence landslide: the Truss legacy and 'time for a change'. Scotland turned Labour after the SNP collapse; Reform split the Conservative coalition; The Sun backed Labour for the first time since 1997; the lowest turnout since 2001. |
The Murdoch press is the standard case: The Sun backed the Conservatives decisively in 1979; gaining its support was pivotal for Labour in 1997, as it was for Conservative fortunes in 2010 and through the 1980s (2022 mocks MS); in 2024 it backed Labour for the first time since 1997. Counter: newspaper choice may reflect the reader's views rather than alter them (2020 MS), and press primacy has been eroded by social media, broadcast and word-of-mouth.
Television and radio must be neutral by law, yet the 2022 mocks mark scheme insists their importance cannot be overestimated in a world of personality and sound bites - a slip on broadcast media can be fatal. Cases: Thatcher's television coaching (1979); Foot unable to project authority in the broadcast age (1983); Sunak's D-Day departure running for days in 2024.
Reaches the younger, lowest-turnout voters the press cannot (2022 mocks MS). 2019: Conservative dominance of Facebook ad spend with micro-targeting in Red Wall seats. 2024: Reform UK's social media strength matched the personal coverage of Farage. Counter: targeted reach is not turnout, and 18-24 turnout remains the lowest of any group.
Polls belong to this topic through spec point P1.4.2.a - their importance and relevance during and between elections. The essentials to carry: