HomeTopic packsJudgement grid › Detailed notes
← Back to the grid
Detailed notes behind the judgement grid

Global political theories - judgement grid

Every judgement on the grid, with the full evidence and named examples behind it. One card per row - open a card and read the case across all 6 columns.

Realism

States are the dominant actors operating in anarchy, pursuing national interest defined as security and power, unable fully to trust one another, with war a recurring feature.

States are the key actors [+]

states are the dominant actors; billiard balls in anarchy

Realism treats states as the dominant actors, billiard balls colliding in anarchy. It does poorly on non-state actors such as multinationals, NGOs and terrorist groups, which realists tend to call anomalies.

Anarchy drives behaviour [+]

anarchy is the bedrock condition shaping all behaviour

For neo-realism the real driver is structure: anarchy forces any state, whatever its regime type, to balance and pursue security. Anarchy is the bedrock condition that shapes how states behave.

Durable cooperation [-]

cooperation is possible but limited and power-contingent

Realism holds that cooperation is possible but limited and contingent on the balance of power. States cannot trust one another because there is no enforcement of agreements above them, and war remains a recurring feature.

Institutions and law [-]

institutions reflect power; the EU is a problem case

Realism does poorly on the EU, the WTO and the ICJ. Realists usually treat institutions that constrain great powers as anomalies, marginal cases, or the products of underlying power rather than genuine constraints.

Human nature pessimistic [±]

classical realism yes; neo-realism roots it in structure

Classical realism (Morgenthau, 1948) roots behaviour in a Hobbesian, power-seeking human nature. Neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) rejects that and points to structure instead, so the tradition is split on this claim.

Ideas shape interests [-]

interests come from power and structure, not identity

Realism explains behaviour through security, power and the balance of power, not identity. Critics note realism cannot explain identity-driven patterns such as post-1945 German or Japanese pacifism.

Liberalism

Cooperation is possible and durable; states are not the only actors; institutions, interdependence and democratic peace tame anarchy.

States are the key actors [-]

states are not the only actors; IGOs, NGOs, MNCs matter

Liberalism holds that states are not the only actors: international institutions, NGOs and multinational corporations all shape outcomes. This is a direct rejection of the realist billiard-ball picture.

Anarchy drives behaviour [-]

anarchy does not prevent cooperation

For liberalism anarchy does not dictate behaviour: states can build institutions that bind themselves, and trade interdependence raises the cost of war. Anarchy does not prevent durable cooperation.

Durable cooperation [+]

cooperation is durable through institutions and trade

Liberalism holds that cooperation is possible and durable. Institutions reduce the costs of cooperation and build trust, complex interdependence raises the cost of war, and democracies rarely fight one another.

Institutions and law [+]

institutions reduce transaction costs and constrain states

Neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane) argues institutions reduce transaction costs, build reputation and monitor compliance. The WTO, EU, NATO and the Paris ratchet are read as genuine constraints on great powers.

Human nature pessimistic [-]

the order is improvable, not fixed by grim human nature

Liberalism rejects the pessimistic frame: the international order is improvable through law, trade and the spread of democracy. Kant's Perpetual Peace argued war would diminish as states became republics.

Ideas shape interests [±]

regime type matters, but mechanisms are material

Democratic peace theory makes regime type and shared democratic norms matter, which leans ideational, but liberalism mainly explains cooperation through material mechanisms such as institutions and trade interdependence.

The English School

There is more order in international politics than realists admit, because states form a society of states sharing norms, rules and institutions. Order coexists with anarchy.

States are the key actors [+]

a society of states; non-state actors underweighted

The English School is built around a society of states sharing rules of sovereignty, diplomacy and non-intervention. Critics argue its focus on states underweighs non-state actors and economic globalisation.

Anarchy drives behaviour [±]

anarchical but also a society, so order coexists with anarchy

The English School accepts the realist premise that international politics is anarchical, but argues it is also a society. Order coexists with anarchy because states share norms, so anarchy alone does not dictate behaviour.

Durable cooperation [+]

ordered coexistence rests on shared rules and consent

The English School sees real international order resting on consent and shared understanding. Coordinated sanctions on Russia look like a society of states punishing a rule-breaker, not just power politics.

Institutions and law [+]

five institutions: law, diplomacy, balance of power and more

Bull identified five institutions of the society of states: balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war as a regulated practice, and great-power management. Norms shape behaviour even when states violate them.

Human nature pessimistic [-]

rejects the Hobbesian state of nature framing

The English School argues international society is different from a Hobbesian state of nature: shared norms, rules and a sense of common interests make it more ordered than a grim view of human nature implies.

Ideas shape interests [±]

norms and shared understanding matter, but it is state-centric

Shared norms, rules and mutual recognition do real work for the English School, which is partly ideational. But it remains state-centric and rooted in the institutions of a society of states rather than identity.

Constructivism

Identities and ideas shape what states want in the first place; interests are socially constructed, not fixed by material structure. Anarchy is what states make of it.

States are the key actors [±]

states act, but identities and norms are the real focus

Constructivism still works mainly at the level of states, but its real focus is the ideas, norms and identities that shape them, and it studies how norms cascade across the system rather than treating states as fixed units.

Anarchy drives behaviour [-]

anarchy is what states make of it

Constructivism rejects the idea that anarchy has a single meaning. Wendt argues anarchy is what states make of it: the same structure can produce Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian cultures depending on what states believe.

Durable cooperation [±]

cooperation depends on the culture of anarchy in play

Whether states cooperate depends on the culture of anarchy that predominates. Western Europe shifted from Hobbesian enemies to largely Kantian friends, so durable cooperation is possible but ideationally contingent.

Institutions and law [±]

norms matter and can cascade, but ideas come first

Constructivists study how norms spread and become taken for granted, such as the norm against chemical weapons. Norms and rules matter, but they work through shared belief rather than as material institutional constraints.

Human nature pessimistic [-]

no fixed human nature; behaviour follows belief

Constructivism rejects a fixed, pessimistic human nature. The same structural condition can produce different behaviours depending on what states believe about themselves and others.

Ideas shape interests [+]

interests flow from identity; Zeitenwende the case

Constructivism holds that what states want flows from who they think they are. Germany's post-1945 anti-militarist identity, and the 2022 Zeitenwende rearmament, show identity-driven behaviour realism cannot explain.