The Supreme Court has been at the centre of political controversy since 2017 - Miller I (Article 50), Miller II (prorogation 2019), the Begum case 2024, and the 2024 'sex' ruling. The 2025 examiner report has not yet been published in its detail on this question, but Q2-style questions on the judiciary and the executive are due. The 2024 Labour government has signalled judicial reform on the agenda. Q2 essays on the Supreme Court typically appear roughly every three years (last full version 2021).
In Miller II 2019 the Supreme Court ruled Boris Johnson's prorogation of Parliament unlawful. The judgment used the common-law principle of parliamentary sovereignty to limit a prerogative power. Critics including Jonathan Sumption (former Supreme Court justice) argued this was the Court entering political territory - questioning the timing and motivation of an executive decision rather than a clear-cut legal point.
The 2017 Miller I case ruled that the government needed parliamentary approval to trigger Article 50. Critics argued this drew the Court into the political process of leaving the EU. Daily Mail headline: 'Enemies of the People' (November 2016 over the Divisional Court ruling, before Supreme Court appeal).
Successive judgments under the Human Rights Act have struck down or required modification of government policy on prisoner voting (Hirst v UK 2005), torture evidence, surveillance, deportation. Critics argue these effectively transfer policy authority from elected ministers to unelected judges.
Lord Sumption (Reith Lectures 2019, 'Trials of the State') argued the Supreme Court has expanded its role beyond the constitutional design of the CRA 2005. He saw a long-term shift from judicial restraint to judicial activism, with the Court increasingly willing to second-guess political judgments under the cover of legal interpretation.
The Court has ruled on Scottish independence-referendum law (2022), Northern Ireland protocol matters, and devolved competence cases. Each draws the Court into politically charged territory where reasonable people disagree.
In Miller II the Court did not rule on whether prorogation was a good idea. It ruled that prorogation must not frustrate parliamentary sovereignty. The judgment turned on a legal principle, applied consistently. The Court did the same to a Labour government in past cases. Politics is the issues coming before the Court; politics is not the Court itself.
The Supreme Court replaced the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords from October 2009. The CRA 2005 was specifically designed to separate the senior judiciary from Parliament and government - a structural shift towards more, not less, neutrality. Justices are appointed by an independent Judicial Appointments Commission, not by political ministers.
In the Rwanda case the Court ruled that the government's policy was unlawful because Rwanda was not a safe country. Critics called this political; defenders pointed out the Court applied the existing legal test for refoulement and reached a finding of fact based on evidence. The government responded by legislating to declare Rwanda safe by statute - showing that Parliament retains ultimate authority.
The Court ruled that Shamima Begum's deprivation of citizenship was lawful, despite arguments about her age and trafficking. This was a politically inconvenient ruling for some on the left and for civil-liberties campaigners. The Court ruling against the campaign-inflected position is evidence that judges follow the law, not political preference.
Unlike the US Supreme Court where appointments are intensely political, UK Supreme Court justices are appointed via the JAC's merit-based process. Confirmation hearings do not exist. This is structural insulation from political control.
The stronger answer is NO - the Supreme Court has not become too political. The political controversy comes from the issues before it (Brexit, prorogation, Rwanda, citizenship deprivation, devolution disputes), not from the Court itself. Sumption's critique is sophisticated but applies more to the Strasbourg court than to the UK Supreme Court. The CRA 2005 structural reforms and the JAC appointment process insulate the Court from political control. Rulings against both Conservative and Labour governments (Miller I+II Conservative; Begum Conservative-era policy upheld) demonstrate consistent rule-based reasoning.
The Supreme Court has not become too political. Politics has come to the Court through the issues; the Court itself remains rule-based and structurally independent.