Point: A defender of ministerial responsibility might argue that the doctrine still works because serious misconduct still costs ministers their jobs.
Example: In 2020 the Cabinet Office found that Priti Patel had bullied civil servants in breach of the Ministerial Code.
This shows: On this reading, the Code investigated, found wrongdoing and produced a public report - the doctrine functioned as it should.
However... However, what happened next is what matters.
Counter example: Boris Johnson kept Patel in post against the recommendation of his own adviser on ministerial interests, Sir Alex Allan, who then resigned in protest. Patel served as Home Secretary for two further years.
This shows: This shows the sanction in IMR depends on the Prime Minister deciding to apply it. Where the PM chooses to protect a minister, the doctrine produces no consequence.
Interim judgement: On balance, Patel 2020 is decisive evidence that IMR no longer effectively holds ministers to account: it bites only when the PM wants it to.
Point: A second argument for the doctrine's health is that Suella Braverman resigned and was later fired, showing the system does process serious failings.
Example: Braverman resigned in October 2022 over a security breach, was re-appointed by Sunak within six days, and was fired in November 2023 over an unauthorised article on protest policing.
This shows: On this view, the doctrine pulled her out twice for clear breaches.
However... However, the six-day re-appointment is what matters.
Counter example: Re-appointing a minister within a week of her resignation, on the same grounds she resigned over, drains the resignation of meaning. The sanction did not stick because the executive chose to overrule its own initial verdict.
This shows: This shows the strongest possible single example of IMR being treated by the executive itself as a public-relations tool rather than as a constitutional discipline.
Interim judgement: The Braverman pattern is further evidence that IMR no longer effectively holds the executive to account.
Point: A defender of collective ministerial responsibility might point to Kwasi Kwarteng's sacking as Chancellor in October 2022 as evidence the doctrine still works.
Example: Liz Truss fired Kwarteng less than six weeks into his appointment after the mini-budget triggered the largest peacetime crisis in market confidence in the UK.
This shows: On this view, the doctrine produced its sanction: the Chancellor lost his job.
However... However, CMR was never actually engaged in the mini-budget process.
Counter example: The mini-budget bypassed Cabinet discussion entirely, was not presented to the OBR, and was not collectively endorsed by the wider Cabinet. The CMR principle that decisions are collectively owned was inverted: the decision was personally owned and the Cabinet was excluded.
This shows: This shows the doctrine had been hollowed out before the political failure. Kwarteng was sacked but CMR did not function as a check on the decision being made in the first place.
Interim judgement: The Truss-Kwarteng episode supports the view that CMR no longer effectively holds the executive to account: the principle was suspended in practice before it was applied in form.
Point: A further argument is that the routine leaking of Cabinet discussions has fatally damaged the principle that ministers speak with one voice.
Example: Under Johnson, Truss, Sunak and Starmer, Cabinet papers and discussions have leaked routinely to the press. Briefings against Angela Rayner appeared in 2025 before her resignation.
This shows: On a strict reading of CMR, each of these leaks should have triggered an investigation and a resignation.
However... However, very few of these leaks have produced any consequence at all.
Counter example: No minister has been publicly dismissed for leaking against a Cabinet colleague in recent years, despite leaks being a near-daily feature of UK political coverage. The doctrine's sanction has effectively disappeared.
This shows: This shows that CMR's most important rule - public unity on collective decisions - has been quietly retired in practice.
Interim judgement: On the evidence of routine leaks, CMR is no longer functioning as an effective check on Cabinet behaviour.
Point: Finally, defenders argue that the Ministerial Code and the independent adviser on ministerial interests give the doctrines real institutional teeth.
Example: The Ministerial Code sets out the standards expected of ministers and the independent adviser is appointed to investigate alleged breaches.
This shows: On this view, the framework for accountability still exists and continues to function.
However... However, the framework depends entirely on the Prime Minister.
Counter example: The Code is enforced by the Prime Minister, who decides whether to commission an investigation, whether to accept the findings, and whether to impose any sanction. Sir Alex Allan resigned in 2020 over Patel; Sir Christopher Geidt resigned in 2022 over Johnson. Both successive advisers walked when their own findings were ignored.
This shows: This shows the supposedly independent enforcement mechanism is in fact controlled by the very office it is meant to check.
Interim judgement: The structure of ministerial accountability has the form of independent enforcement but the substance of executive control. On balance, ministerial responsibility no longer effectively holds the executive to account.