The exam board rotates which constitutional topic gets the Section A source question. Devolution has not been a source question since 2020. Six years is the longest gap of any spec area, so devolution is overdue and is the single most-likely Q1(b) topic this summer.
Four recent events make a question on devolution and the Union very likely. First, the UK government used Section 35 of the Scotland Act for the first time in January 2023 to block Holyrood's Gender Recognition Reform Bill - the most serious devolution flashpoint since the 2014 referendum. Second, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended from February 2022 to January 2024 over the NI Protocol but power-sharing was restored without a return to violence. Third, the Welsh Senedd's 20mph default speed limit (in force from September 2023) sparked a UK-wide debate about whether devolution should be allowed to diverge so visibly from England. Fourth, the 2025 examiner report praised answers that connected the four nations rather than treating Scotland in isolation. All four point to a Q1(b) source question on devolution and the Union.
This is a Section A source question worth 30 marks. Marks split roughly equally between AO1 (your knowledge of the devolution settlement), AO2 (analysis of what the SOURCE actually says, not just what you know), and AO3 (your judgement, where you pick a side and stick to it).
The source you get on the day will be similar in structure to this. It will carry TWO clearly-labelled views: one that agrees with the question's claim, and one that disagrees. Your job is to compare and contrast the two views, debate them in a balanced way, and reach your own judgement using only the information in the source.
The Union is more fragile after twenty-seven years of devolution than it was in 1997. The Scotland Act 2016 handed Holyrood full income-tax powers, which created a permanent constituency for further demands. The 2014 referendum was 55-45 against independence, but support for independence remained at or above 45 per cent for most of the decade that followed. The use of Section 35 in 2023 to block the Scottish Gender Recognition Reform Bill triggered the worst Westminster-Holyrood stand-off since devolution began and was treated by the SNP as evidence that the Union is a one-way street running south. The Welsh Senedd has used its tax and policy powers to diverge sharply from England (the 20mph default speed limit, Welsh-language requirements). The Sewel Convention - that Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters without consent - was broken without consequence over Brexit, the Internal Market Act 2020 and the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The Supreme Court ruled in Miller 1 (2017) that Sewel is a political convention, not legally enforceable. Devolution created the platforms from which nationalist parties have built permanent challenge to the Union, and the constitutional brakes on Westminster have been tested and found weak.
Every headline test of the Union since 1997 has been passed. The 1997 referendums produced 74 per cent Yes in Scotland and a narrow 50.3 per cent Yes in Wales, building devolution with democratic legitimacy. The 2014 Scottish independence referendum was 55-45 No. The Good Friday Agreement (1998) ended over thirty years of violence and the Northern Ireland Assembly has been restored to function after every suspension, including the 2022-24 Protocol stand-off, without a return to the Troubles. Welsh independence support has stayed below 30 per cent. Support for Scottish independence has been broadly flat at 45-48 per cent for a decade, not rising. The Internal Market Act 2020 demonstrated Westminster can still legislate for the whole UK economic space even when devolved governments object. Section 35 was used lawfully and the courts upheld its use. The Sewel Convention is unenforceable but the convention exists at all, which says something about the political weight Westminster gives to consent. Devolution has channelled nationalism into devolved institutions where it can be tested in elections, rather than driving it onto the streets. That is the opposite of putting the Union at greater risk.
This side argues that the asymmetric settlement created by Labour from 1997 has steadily built up nationalist confidence and political infrastructure in all three devolved nations, while the constitutional brakes on Westminster have been shown to be unreliable. The evidence falls into five areas: the rise of nationalist parties, the Scotland Act 2016 tax powers, post-Brexit divergence, Section 35, and the weakness of Sewel.
Before devolution, the SNP held three Westminster seats in 1992. After devolution, the SNP has run the Scottish Government continuously since 2007 - eighteen years. Plaid Cymru has been the junior partner in Welsh Labour-led cooperation deals. Sinn Fein became the largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly for the first time in 2022. The institutions devolution created have given nationalist parties permanent platforms, party machines, ministers and budgets. Without those platforms, nationalist parties would be much weaker.
The Scotland Act 2016 gave Holyrood full income-tax setting powers (rates and bands but not personal allowance). Scotland now sets noticeably different tax rates from rUK - a 45 per cent top rate kicks in at lower income than in England, and there are additional bands. The political effect is that Scottish governments now have to defend tax decisions to Scottish voters alone - which strengthens the Scottish political community, not the UK-wide one.
Brexit removed the common EU regulatory framework that had quietly held the UK single market together. Westminster passed the Internal Market Act 2020 to fill the gap, but did so over the objections of Holyrood, the Senedd and Stormont, all of which refused legislative consent. Northern Ireland was left inside parts of the EU single market for goods (the Windsor Framework, 2023). The asymmetric outcome has fuelled grievance in all three devolved nations.
The UK government's first-ever use of Section 35 of the Scotland Act 1998, in January 2023, blocked Holyrood's Gender Recognition Reform Bill from receiving royal assent. The Scottish government's legal challenge in the Court of Session failed in December 2023. The SNP framed it as Westminster overriding a devolved decision and used it to argue that devolution has limits Westminster will impose whenever it wants. The flashpoint was the most serious devolution stand-off since 2014.
Sewel says Westminster will not normally legislate on devolved matters without consent. In Miller 1 (2017) the Supreme Court ruled Sewel is a political convention, not legally enforceable. Westminster has legislated without consent on the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 and the Internal Market Act 2020. If the convention can be broken whenever Westminster chooses, the constitutional protection devolution was supposed to offer is much weaker than it looked in 1998.
| Event / Statute | Year | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| Scotland Act 2016 | 2016 | Full income-tax setting power - permanent Scottish fiscal political community |
| EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act | 2020 | Westminster legislated without devolved consent on EU exit |
| Internal Market Act 2020 | 2020 | Westminster overrode devolved objections to protect UK single market |
| Section 35 / GRR Bill | 2023 | First-ever Westminster veto of a Holyrood Bill |
This side argues that every major test of the Union since 1997 has been passed, and that devolution has channelled nationalist energy into devolved institutions rather than driving it onto the streets. The evidence falls into five areas: the 1997 mandates, the 2014 referendum result, the Good Friday Agreement, the Internal Market Act precedent, and the absence of a sustained majority for independence anywhere.
Devolution was built on referendum mandates. Scotland 74.3 per cent Yes for a Parliament, 63.5 per cent Yes for tax powers. Wales 50.3 per cent Yes for an Assembly - very narrow but on the right side of fifty. Northern Ireland 71.1 per cent Yes for the Good Friday Agreement. Democratic legitimacy was built in from day one. The argument that devolution is destabilising is hard to sustain when the institutions were created by majorities in all three nations.
The 2014 Scottish independence referendum was 55-45 No on the largest UK referendum turnout (84.6 per cent) ever. Crucially, the Edinburgh Agreement (2012) showed Westminster will allow a referendum when there is a clear democratic mandate for one. In the decade since, support for independence has been broadly flat at 45-48 per cent in polling. It has not built. The clearest political fact since 2014 is that a second independence referendum has not been granted and Scotland has not pushed itself out of the Union.
Northern Ireland is the strongest test of devolution. Power-sharing under the 1998 Good Friday Agreement ended three decades of violence that had killed over 3,500 people. Even during the 2022-24 Assembly suspension over the NI Protocol, sectarian violence did not return. The Windsor Framework (2023) resolved the most contentious technical aspects of the Protocol, and the Assembly was restored in January 2024. Devolution has held in the place where it had the highest stakes.
View 1 reads the Internal Market Act 2020 as weakening the devolved settlement. View 2 reads it the other way - the Act demonstrated Westminster can still legislate for the whole UK economic space when it needs to, despite devolved objections. The asymmetric settlement gives Westminster the power to defend the Union when it must. The fact that Westminster can override the Sewel Convention is, on this reading, a feature, not a bug.
Support for Welsh independence has stayed below 30 per cent in polling throughout the devolution era. The Senedd has used its powers to diverge in policy (the 20mph default speed limit from September 2023, the basic-income pilot, Welsh-language education) but Plaid Cymru has never threatened to break through to majority status. Welsh devolution has done exactly what View 2 says devolution does: provided a constitutional outlet for distinct national identity without breaking the Union.
| Event / Statute | Year | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 referendums | 1997 | 74% Scotland, 50.3% Wales - devolution built on democratic mandate |
| Good Friday Agreement | 1998 | Ended three decades of violence; NI Assembly restored after every suspension |
| 2014 independence referendum | 2014 | 55-45 No on record 84.6% turnout; no second referendum granted since |
| Internal Market Act precedent | 2020 | Westminster retained power to legislate for whole UK over devolved objections |
Edexcel mark schemes are clear: top-band answers commit to one of the two views and defend it the whole way through. Fence-sitting answers ("both sides have a point", "it depends") stay at Level 3.
For this question, the stronger side is View 2: devolution has NOT put the Union at greater risk. The 2014 referendum was 55-45 No on record turnout. Support for independence has been flat at 45-48 per cent for a decade. The Good Friday Agreement ended thirty years of violence. The NI Assembly came back after the 2022-24 suspension without violence returning. The Internal Market Act 2020 showed Westminster can still defend the UK single market when it needs to. Devolution has channelled nationalism into devolved chambers rather than onto the streets. That is the opposite of putting the Union at greater risk.
So the answer is no, the view in the question is wrong. Use View 1's evidence (Section 35, weak Sewel, post-Brexit divergence) to build the counter-arguments, then knock them down by pointing to referendum results, the NI peace and the Internal Market Act.
The view in the question is wrong: devolution has not put the future of the Union at greater risk. Every headline test of the Union since 1997 has been passed, support for independence has been flat for a decade in Scotland and below 30 per cent in Wales, and Northern Ireland has stayed in power-sharing without violence returning. The constitutional flashpoints (Section 35, the Internal Market Act) actually show Westminster retains the legal tools to defend the Union when it must. View 2 wins.