AO1: The appointments system politicises the Supreme Court because they are often made on an ideological basis by president who seeks to influence the make-up of the SC. AO2: This can allow presidents to change the ideological makeup of the SC, particularly if the opportunity arises to appoint more than one justice. AO3: Therefore because appointments are for life, presidential appointments can change the ideological outlook of the SC in the long-term. AO1: Senate confirmation hearings are often influenced by which president is in office, meaning that the success or failure of an individual nominee can be a politicised process. AO2: This can give a president with his own party in charge of the Senate a higher chance of success in appointments. AO3: This can also work in reverse - when a president faces opposition in the Senate - with the active prevention of confirmation hearings for political rather than judicial reasons, e.g. Garland. AO1: Media coverage/perception of SC justices enhances their increasing political role, e.g. Ruth Bader Ginsberg features heavily in profiles of the SC. AO2: This has been supported by the increasing number of social and/or controversial issues that the SC has chosen to hear cases on. AO3: Therefore the SC has been criticised for taking on a quasi-judicial role. AO1: SC is often finely-balanced between liberal and conservative judges, so leading to 'swing justices' who may have disproportionate influence over key issues. AO2: This means that when the opportunity to appoint a justice arises, presidents will seek to influence the ideological makeup of the SC by nominating a justice aligned with their liberal or conservative ideology. AO3: This suggests that appointments are more focused on ideology than judicial suitability.

AO1: Once in office SC justices are independent of presidential or congressional influence, so maintaining their judicial role. AO2: This means that there are few checks on the power of the SC thus allowing justices to make decisions as they see fit rather than as their appointees wish them to. AO3: This prevents presidents or Congress from having undue influence over judicial decisions. AO1: SC appointments are for life: only other justices can remove them through the impeachment process. AO2: This prevents the other branches from threatening to remove SC justices from power who do not support their views. AO3: Therefore SC justices can make decisions based on law rather than based on political influence. AO1: SC justices do not have to follow the ideology expected of them by the president appointing them e.g. Warren was more liberal than expected. AO2: This reinforces the separation of powers as presidents cannot influence decisions made once justices are appointed. AO3: This limits the political effect of the appointments system because justices are independent of the executive and legislative branches. AO1: Justices are often reluctant to make overtly political decisions and can defer to the elected branches instead. AO2: The use of judicial restraint allows justices to avoid 'meddling' in political issues. AO3: Therefore preserving the separation of powers and preventing potential conflict between the branches if the SC rules executive or legislative action is unconstitutional.