AO1: The use of collective responsibility is down to the whim of the sitting PM. AO2: It is inconsistently applied, with collective responsibility being lifted over the 1975 and 2016 EU referendum, and over Heathrow expansion under May. AO3: and once lifted, it is much harder for it to return, showing the weakness of collective accountability since 2016. AO1: Cabinet leaks and ministers disagreeing in public without resigning undermine collective responsibility. AO2: This appeared to be particularly true when PM May was in power, with multiple cabinet leaks, ministers disagreeing in public and even abstaining on a three-line whip vote. AO3: showing that collective accountability has been significantly weakened. AO1: The PM upholds the code of individual ministerial responsibility. AO2: The PM is the ultimate judge of standards, and the convention of individual ministerial responsibility is applied inconsistently, with some ministers remaining in post, such as Patel during Johnson's time as PM, whilst others resign or are fired using the power of patronage like Hancock; such decisions are often based on political considerations rather than a strict understanding of the convention. AO3: meaning that the convention is losing its ability to ensure the effective accountability of individual ministers. AO1: Ministers now seek to avoid responsibility for mistakes within their departments or have often left office by the time poor decisions, policies and actions come to light. AO2: Ministers have often left office by the time errors come to light, so can't be held to account (Grayling and the privatisation of probation service) or pass the buck onto those who work for them, rather than accepting responsibility (Williamson and exam results 2020). AO3: which effectively undermines the ability of individual ministerial responsibility to hold ministers to account for their failings.

AO1: Collective responsibility works to ensure government is collectively accountable to parliament. AO2: For the most part, the discipline of collective ministerial responsibility operates effectively, and was reinstated by PM Johnson following the more tumultuous time of May. This was evidenced in the mass resignation from the Johnson government when ministers could no longer support the PM. AO3: suggesting that the weakness of CMR could be attributed to the circumstances of Brexit and it has again assumed its importance again in holding the government collectively accountable. AO1: The flexibility of the collective ministerial responsibility is one of its key attributes. AO2: It allows the PM to open up the debate on matters that go beyond the traditional party positions and left-right spectrum – like the EU – allowing to the full range of voices to be heard. AO3: and preserves collective responsibility and its role in government accountability. AO1: Individual ministerial responsibility still has considerable impact, especially in personal matters, and it is right that ministers only resign where there are significant professional mistakes. AO2: Individual ministerial responsibility has real bite, especially in personal matters (Hancock 2021, Patel 2017), and it is right that ministers do resign where there have been significant mistakes (Rudd 2018). AO3: reflecting its ability to hold individual ministers to account. AO1: Parliament can hold ministers to account. AO2: The scrutiny powers of Parliaments such as PMQs, Ministers' Questions, Urgent Questions, Departmental Select Committees and the Liaison Committee all provide legitimate avenues to hold the government and ministers to account under both conventions. AO3: suggesting that both conventions remain significant for accountability.