AO1: The passing of the Constitutional Reform Act in 2005 has created a strict separation of powers. AO2: The Constitutional Reform Act has created a clear separation of powers, by creating the Supreme Court, splitting out the role of Lord Chancellor and establishing an independent appointments process to protect the independence of the judiciary. AO3: We can conclude that the principle of judicial independence has been strengthened by the Act so that is sufficient in supporting the rule of law in UK democracy. AO1: Ministers are committed to the principle of judicial independence whilst judges understand the limits to their role so they don’t become engaged in policy making. AO2: The Supreme Court practices judicial restraint (Nicklinson 2014) whilst Ministers remain committed in public to protecting the independence of the judiciary. The Court is taking on more of a constitutional role and more rights cases but this has been brought about the passage of the HRA and the constitutional reforms since 1997. AO3: We can conclude that the principle of judicial independence is understood and preserved by both Ministers and the AO1: Supreme Court judges to ensure sufficient independence whilst the expanded role is due to Acts of Parliament passed by elected politicians. AO2: The Supreme Court Judges sign up to the principle of judicial neutrality. AO3: Supreme Court judges recognise that in order to maintain the confidence of the public they must practice judicial neutrality by avoiding political activity and cases are live streamed to create a level of transparency and accountability. AO1: We can conclude that Supreme Court recognise the importance of judicial neutrality to their legitimacy so uphold the principle ensuring sufficient neutrality. AO2: The Supreme Court is becoming more diverse. AO3: The Supreme Court is becoming more diverse, creating a clearer impression that the Court is neutral.

AO1: The main criticism of judicial independence in the UK was the lack of a strict separation of powers up to the creation of the AO2: Supreme Court in 2009. AO3: The role of the Lord Chancellor, the judicial appointments process and the highest court of the land being in the House of AO1: Lords were all seen as threats to judicial independence. AO2: We can conclude that prior to 2009 that the principle of judicial independence was not sufficient in the UK. AO3: There has been a growing willingness of Ministers to criticise the Supreme Court whilst the courts are taking an increasingly judicially active role AO1: This growing willingness, seen in both the Cherry/Miller cases, of Ministers to criticise the Court and its decisions is a threat to judicial independence whilst increasingly the Court is taking a judicially active role taking in rights cases and constitutional cases. AO2: We can conclude that judicial independence is increasingly under threat from public attacks by the Executive branch and from the Court straying into politics due to judicial activism. AO3: The growing attacks by the media on the character of judges rather than the decisions of the Court. AO1: These attacks, in particular over the Article 50 ruling, were seen as undermining judicial neutrality in the eyes of the public undermining the rule of law and the legitimacy of the judiciary. AO2: We can conclude that increased press attacks on judges rather than Court decisions undermine the principle of judicial neutrality. AO3: The Supreme Court lacks diversity leading to claims of bias. AO1: The Court’s lack of diversity leads to accusations that its lack of social diversity undermines its neutrality whilst others see it as having an inbuilt liberal bias. AO2: We can conclude that the Court is seen by critics from both the left and right of politics as not being judicially neutral.