AO1: With no separation of powers or a codified constitution, the Court has helped to rebalance the relationship between Parliament and the executive. AO2: The establishment of the SC has led to a significant re-balancing of the powers between parliament and executive - the Miller/Cherry cases were not about Brexit but about where constitutional powers lie. AO3: We can conclude that this shows that the SC can serve to strengthen and advance parliamentary sovereignty. AO1: Judicial reviews, such as this, often uphold the rights of Parliament. AO2: Judicial reviews are an important way of limiting the powers of governments that act ultra vires, trying to by-pass parliament. AO3: We can form the judgement that the SC therefore has strengthened parliamentary sovereignty. AO1: The SC's defends parliament against an overmighty executive, acting as guardian of democracy. AO2: As the executive has grown in power, it has been seen by some to be aiming to avoid scrutiny and accountability in Parliament for its actions undermining democracy. The Court's decisions have helped to protect Parliament against this. AO3: We can reach the judgment that this significant rebalancing has strengthened parliamentary sovereignty against an over-mighty executive. AO1: The SC upholds the rule of law. AO2: As the SC upholds the rule of law, as legislated by parliament, this in turn strengthens parliamentary sovereignty. AO3: We can conclude that the SC's support for maintaining the rule of law shows that it has strengthened parliamentary sovereignty.

AO1: Judges should not make judgements in political areas, such as Brexit. AO2: This judgement shows that the SC has strayed into areas of 'politics' and this undermines parliamentary sovereignty. Politics should be left to the democratically elected House. AO3: We can form the judgement that the SC has not strengthened parliamentary sovereignty. AO1: Judicial reviews lead to unelected judges challenging the will of the government and thus in effect Parliament. AO2: Judicial reviews can lead, in practice, to challenges to decisions taken by an elected government, whose democratic power is based in Parliament and should be held accountable by a democratically elected Parliament rather than an unelected Court. AO3: We can conclude therefore that the use of judicial review by the SC has not strengthened parliamentary sovereignty. AO1: Declarations of incompatibility challenge parliamentary sovereignty. AO2: Where the Courts decide an Act of Parliament is incompatible with human rights, it can make a declaration of incompatibility. i.e. Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 or Civil Partnerships Act 2004. This is a challenge to parliamentary sovereignty as it implies a higher form of justification of law than parliament. AO3: We can form a judgement that parliamentary sovereignty is not strengthened by the introduction of declarations of incompatibility in Section 4 of the HRA. AO1: The current system lacks clarity. AO2: The effect of this lack of clarity is to undermine parliamentary sovereignty as the SC has taken on additional powers at the expense of parliament. AO3: We can reach a judgement that parliamentary sovereignty has not been strengthened by the lack of clarity of our political system.