AO1: Peerages can be offered as part of patronage (for previous service and/or large donations to political parties). AO2: The clear statistical link between large donors and successful nomination to the Lords is evidence that rich donors are being rewarded by becoming peers – i.e. repeated cash for honours scandals, thus distorting the membership of the Lords. AO3: We can conclude that the current system is open to abuse of patronage and therefore the membership of the Lords requires reform. AO1: The House is not representative. AO2: The average age of the Lords is 70; just over a quarter are women and only 6% are from ethnic minorities whilst the educational background and class background of peers is also very skewed. AO3: We can form a judgement that the current system produces a House that is deeply unrepresentative of the wider public so it membership is in need of reform. AO1: The House lacks democratic legitimacy. AO2: The Lords have no democratic connection with the public and are not held accountable by the electorate via elections. The lack of democratic legitimacy weakens the House and weakens democracy in the UK. AO3: We can form the conclusion that since the current system produces a chamber which lacks the authority to challenge the elected government, it cannot effectively fulfil its purpose of scrutiny, and therefore requires reform to its membership. AO1: The chamber is too weak to do its job AO2: The current system lacks the legitimacy of the system of electing MPs and produces a legislature which lacks the authority (and the power) to do its job as a revising chamber that scrutinises legislation and its job of checking and challenging the actions of the government. AO3: We can conclude that the role and membership of the House of Lords needs reform if it is to perform its key functions within UK democracy.

AO1: The appointment system allows for an increased number of experts to be selected. AO2: The independent House of Lords Appointments Commission, established in 2000 vets all nominations to the Lords and has helped to introduce more experts to the chamber. This produces a more expert membership than the Commons, helping the Lords to fulfil its roles. AO3: We can conclude from the independence and impact of the Appointments Commission on membership of the Lords that the current system does not require reform as it enables the Lords to perform its role. AO1: Membership of the Lords has become more representative. AO2: The Appointments Commission has contributed to improving the representativeness of the second chamber. This is likely to further improve in the future. AO3: We can reach a judgement that the improved representativeness of the Lords shows that its membership does not require reform. AO1: The House has become more professional. AO2: The increased number of life peers, often experts in their field and/or with significant political experience has produced a more effective chamber and committee system. AO3: We can form a judgment that the increased professionalism of the Lords shows that it fulfils its role as a second chamber and does not require reform. AO1: The government is regularly defeated by a more assertive Lords. AO2: The fact that the government is regularly defeated in the Lords since the House of Lords Reform Act shows that the second chamber effectively fulfils its purpose. It has the independence and confidence it needs to challenge the executive. AO3: We can come to the judgement that the higher number of government defeats in the Lords shows that the current system produces a chamber that is able to challenge the government and that therefore the current system does not require reform.