| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | China joins the WTO, 2001 | The landmark of economic globalisation: the largest emerging economy enters the open trading system and lifts hundreds of millions from poverty. | Poverty (agree); advantages; economic globalisation. |
| 2 | The iPhone global supply chain | Economic globalisation made concrete: designed in California, assembled in China from parts worldwide. Deep interconnectedness. | Process of globalisation; interconnectedness. |
| 3 | 2008 global financial crisis | Interdependence as contagion: a US mortgage collapse became a worldwide recession. The dark side of integration. | Disadvantages; against globalisation; interdependence. |
| 4 | K-pop, Afrobeats and Bollywood | Culture flows in many directions, not only from the West, which undercuts the homogenisation and monoculture thesis. | Cultural globalisation; against homogenisation. |
| 5 | Sub-Saharan Africa left behind | Globalisation's gains are uneven; many states and people see little benefit. Anchors the counter-case and dependency theory. | Poverty (counter); inequality. |
| 6 | Brexit, 2020 | A state reclaiming legal sovereignty by leaving a supranational body. Membership was a reversible, sovereign choice. | Sovereignty; sceptic and realist views. |
| 7 | Covid-19 | Both interdependence (a local outbreak goes global) and the state reasserting (border closures, national vaccine programmes). | Impact on the state; transformationalist line. |
| 8 | R2P (2005) and Kosovo | Global norms can override sovereignty to stop atrocity. Sovereignty is no longer treated as absolute. | Intervention; sovereignty; links to Area 3. |
| 9 | The EU as pooled sovereignty | States share sovereignty by choice through a supranational body that can bind them on single-market law. | Sovereignty; supranational v intergovernmental. |
| 10 | Ukraine, 2022 | Great-power rivalry and the sovereign state are alive: globalisation did not prevent war. World order is contested. | Sceptic and realist views; world order since 2000. |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | Shows globalisation and sovereignty under strain: the war spikes oil prices via the Strait of Hormuz (interdependence) and sets intervention against Iranian sovereignty. | Interdependence; sovereignty; intervention. |
| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The UNSC P5 veto | Russia vetoes resolutions on Ukraine; the US vetoes resolutions on Israel. The veto paralyses the UN on the issues that matter most. | UN weaknesses; effectiveness of global governance. |
| 2 | UN peacekeeping record | Mixed: progress in places, but inaction in Rwanda 1994 and stalemate elsewhere shows structural limits. | UN effectiveness; strengths and weaknesses. |
| 3 | NATO and Kosovo, 1999 | NATO acting without a UNSC mandate shows its changing, more interventionist post-Cold War role. | NATO role; UN v NATO comparison (2025 Q1A). |
| 4 | Finland and Sweden join NATO (2023-24) | NATO enlargement in response to Russia: the alliance is expanding, not fading, after the Cold War. | NATO's changing role; relevance. |
| 5 | IMF conditionality and SAPs | Loans tied to austerity and market reform (Greece 2010-12) show Western dominance and the social cost of conditionality. | IMF weaknesses; criticism of economic governance. |
| 6 | World Bank IDA - clean water | Through the IDA the World Bank has given tens of millions access to clean water: the positive development role. | World Bank strengths; poverty. |
| 7 | WTO Appellate Body blocked | The US has blocked appointments since 2019, freezing WTO dispute settlement. The trade body is weakened from within. | WTO weaknesses; reform. |
| 8 | G7 versus G20 | The G20 includes emerging powers and coordinated the 2008 response; the G7 is a richer but less representative club. | G7/G20 comparison (2022 Q1A); representation. |
| 9 | China's Belt and Road and the AIIB | An alternative, no-strings model of economic governance that rivals the Western institutions: non-democratic capitalism. | Rising powers; reform of economic governance. |
| 10 | Sanctions on Russia evaded | China and India keep buying Russian oil, so Western sanctions leak. The limits of Western-led economic governance in a multipolar world. | Effectiveness; multipolarity. |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | The UN Security Council is split and unable to act: the P5 veto and great-power rivalry on full display. | UN weaknesses; effectiveness of global governance. |
| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ICC arrest warrant for Putin, 2023 | The court can name a sitting great-power leader, but cannot enforce it, which exposes the gap between reach and power. | ICC; limits of international law; sovereignty. |
| 2 | ICC: Laurent Gbagbo | Convicted then acquitted after years at The Hague: slow, far from the crimes, and seen as prosecuting only one side. | ICC criticisms (2021 Q1A, 2023 Q1A). |
| 3 | ICJ: Cameroon v Nigeria (Bakassi) | Both states accepted the ruling (2002) and Nigeria handed over the peninsula (2008): the ICJ works when states consent. | ICJ strengths; ICJ v ICC comparison. |
| 4 | UDHR, 1948 | The founding source of authority for universal human rights, but declaratory and non-binding. | Sources of authority; human-rights framework. |
| 5 | ECtHR and the Rwanda flights | A Strasbourg injunction grounded the first UK deportation flight in 2022: international law constraining a sovereign state. | Impact on sovereignty (2025 Q3B). |
| 6 | Libya, 2011 | R2P used for intervention that slid into regime change, then chaos: the overreach case against humanitarian intervention. | Intervention; double standards. |
| 7 | Rwanda, 1994 and Syria | Inaction in Rwanda and veto-driven paralysis over Syria show selective interventionism and Western double standards. | Failures of intervention; UN paralysis. |
| 8 | The Paris Agreement, 2015 | Near-universal participation (a strength) but voluntary, non-binding targets (a weakness): consensus bought with weak commitments. | Environmental governance; UNFCCC. |
| 9 | Kyoto 1997 and Copenhagen 2009 | US non-ratification and the Copenhagen failure show the obstacles: national interest and the developed-developing divide. | Obstacles to cooperation; sovereignty. |
| 10 | The Montreal Protocol, 1987 | The success story: coordinated action repaired the ozone layer, proving global environmental cooperation can work. | Environmental governance (positive); IPCC. |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | Began when nuclear talks collapsed and the US and Israel struck Iran, raising preventive force, international law and double standards. | Human rights; humanitarian intervention. |
| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The USA as superpower | The only state with global hard and soft power: largest military, reserve currency, and cultural reach. | Superpower; hegemony; unipolarity. |
| 2 | China as a rising power | Second economy, rapid military build-up and the Belt and Road: arguably no longer merely emerging. | Emerging v superpower (2019 Q1B, 3(c)). |
| 3 | BRICS and its 2024 expansion | A bloc of emerging powers, now enlarged, presenting a collective challenge to Western dominance: multipolarity. | Emerging powers; multipolarity. |
| 4 | India as an emerging power | Fast growth, the largest population and a non-aligned stance: rising influence without taking sides. | Emerging powers; great v super power. |
| 5 | US withdrawal from Afghanistan, 2021 | Two decades of hard power could not build a stable state: the limits of military power. | Hard v soft power (2024 Q3A). |
| 6 | Gulf and Korean soft power | Qatar's World Cup and Al Jazeera, and South Korean culture, show soft power buying influence without armies. | Soft power; effectiveness. |
| 7 | Russia and Ukraine | A declining great power using hard power to revise borders: a revisionist, arguably rogue, actor. | Great power; hard power; rogue states. |
| 8 | Somalia as a failed state | No effective central government, enabling piracy and terrorism: failed states export instability. | Failed states (2023 Mock Q1A). |
| 9 | North Korea as a rogue state | Nuclear weapons in defiance of international norms: rogue states threaten global order out of proportion to size. | Rogue states; consequences for order. |
| 10 | Return to multipolarity | Power now sits with China, the USA and the EU, with others rising: the unipolar moment has passed. | Polarity; world order since 2000 (2025 Q3C). |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | US and Israeli hard power used against Iran: a live test of the reach and limits of hard power, and of regional power. | Hard power; great and rogue states. |
| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | The EU single market | The deepest form of regionalism: supranational law, a single market and qualified majority voting. | EU as a model; supranationalism. |
| 2 | Maastricht 1992 and 2004 enlargement | The EU both deepened (the euro, citizenship) and widened (eastward enlargement): the widening-deepening tension. | European integration; widening v deepening. |
| 3 | The Eurozone crisis, 2010-12 | Shared currency without shared budgets forced austerity on Greece: the strain of pooled sovereignty. | Limits of integration; constraints on the EU. |
| 4 | Brexit, 2020 | A major member leaving shows integration can reverse and that the intergovernmental pull remains strong. | EU constraints; sovereignty; against deepening. |
| 5 | The African Union | Modelled partly on the EU, with peacekeeping in Somalia, but weaker funding and enforcement. | AU v EU comparison (2023 Mock Q1B). |
| 6 | ASEAN | Consensus, non-interference and the "ASEAN way": a deliberately intergovernmental contrast to the EU. | Forms of regionalism; EU comparison. |
| 7 | NAFTA to USMCA, 2020 | Renegotiated under US pressure: economic regionalism that stays firmly intergovernmental. | Economic regionalism; EU contrast. |
| 8 | The Arab League | Divided and weak, it suspended Syria in 2011: regionalism can lack unity and teeth. | Weaknesses of regionalism (poss. 1a). |
| 9 | The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation | A China and Russia-led security bloc: regionalism as an alternative to the Western-led order. | Security regionalism; multipolarity. |
| 10 | The EU as a global actor | A trade and regulatory giant but reliant on NATO for defence: an economic power, a military lightweight. | EU as a superpower (2021 Q3A). |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | Regional bodies such as the Arab League struggle to shape the conflict, which spills over via Hezbollah and Lebanon. | Regionalism and conflict; weaknesses of regional bodies. |
| # | Example | What it shows (AO2) | Best used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ukraine, 2022 (realism) | Anarchy, the balance of power and the security dilemma in action: states self-help and war remains possible. | Realism; inevitability of war; security dilemma. |
| 2 | US-China rivalry (realism) | A rising power challenging an established one: power politics drives suspicion and competition. | Realism; balance of power; recent developments. |
| 3 | The EU (liberalism) | Complex interdependence and integration make war between members almost unthinkable. | Liberalism; complex interdependence. |
| 4 | Growth of the UN and WTO (liberalism) | Institutions let states cooperate and build trust, softening anarchy. | Liberalism; impact of international organisations. |
| 5 | NATO expansion and Russia | The security dilemma: defensive moves by one side are read as threats by the other, fuelling conflict. | Security dilemma (realist concept). |
| 6 | US-China trade ties | Deep economic interdependence raises the cost of conflict: the liberal answer to realism. | Complex interdependence (2020 Q2). |
| 7 | The UN and international law (society of states) | States accept shared rules and norms, producing order without a world government. | Anarchical society and society of states. |
| 8 | Democratic peace theory | The liberal claim that established democracies do not go to war with each other. | Liberalism; order and security. |
| 9 | Hobbes versus Locke and Mill | Human nature underpins the divide: realists pessimistic (Hobbes), liberals optimistic (Locke, Mill). | Human nature (2022 Q2, Sample Q2). |
| 10 | Realism's resurgence since 2000 | Iraq, Ukraine and authoritarian capitalism suggest realism explains recent events better than liberalism. | Which theory explains developments (2023 Q2, 2025 Q2). |
| 2026 | US-Israel-Iran war (2026) | Realism's case in action: anarchy, the security dilemma and the balance of power outweighing institutions. | Realism; which theory explains developments since 2000. |